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Introduction 
 On January 16, 2003, the Columbia space shuttle set out on its twenty-eighth flight into 
space, in what was characterized as a routine scientific mission.  Two weeks later, the shuttle 
disintegrated while re-entering the earth’s atmosphere, killing the seven astronauts on board.  
Soon thereafter, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) – a star-studded panel of 
experts on the safety of complex, high-risk systems – began trying to understand what had gone 
so terribly wrong.   The investigative board determined the technical cause of the accident within 
several months.  A piece of insulating foam had dislodged from the external tank of the shuttle 
during launch.   That foam debris struck the leading edge of the vehicle’s wing, puncturing a 
hole in it.  During the shuttle’s return to the earth’s atmosphere at the end of the mission, 
extremely hot gases entered the interior of the wing through that hole, melting the structure from 
the inside out.  That melting caused the break-up of the vehicle.   
The investigators did not simply conduct a technical analysis of this catastrophic failure.   
They went on to evaluate the organizational systems, processes, and behaviors that enabled the 
tragedy to occur.  They wanted to understand why NASA kept launching the shuttle despite a 
lengthy history of foam strike problems.  They sought to determine why management had 
concluded that the astronauts were safe, despite some engineers’ serious concerns about the foam 
strike.  The board members noticed organizational problems similar to those uncovered during 
1986 Challenger accident investigation, and they wondered why NASA had not corrected those 
problems in subsequent years.    In the words of CAIB member Duane Deal, a retired Air Force 
General, the investigators sought to go “beyond the widget” during their analysis. They wanted 
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to understand the organizational causes of the catastrophic failure, not simply the technical cause 
(i.e., the widget that broke).   General Deal summarized the board’s findings:  “The foam did it.  
The organization allowed it.”  (Deal, 2004: 44)  
As the board conducted its investigation, many management scholars turned their 
attention to the Columbia accident as well.   These researchers typically wanted to go “beyond 
the widget” to understand the human and organizational conditions that led to this tragedy.  The 
scholars that studied the Columbia accident followed in a long tradition of research into 
catastrophic failures.  Prior studies have examined incidents such as the 1977 Tenerife airliner 
collision, 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, 1986 Challenger explosion, and 
the 1994 friendly fire incident in the Iraqi No-Fly Zone. Why should management researchers be 
interested in these types of complex and unusual tragedies?  According to William Starbuck and 
Moshe Farjoun, who co-edited a book about the Columbia accident, catastrophic failures 
“dramatize how things can go wrong, particularly in large, complex social systems, and so they 
afford opportunities for reflection, learning, and improvement.”  (Starbuck and Farjoun, 2005: 
3).  Moreover, as John Carroll has argued, these events prove to be fertile ground for the 
development of new organizational theory, particularly since the subsequent investigations 
provide rich descriptions of the inner workings – and failings – of individuals, groups, and 
organizations.  These thick, rich descriptions of organizational systems and behaviors provide the 
data required for provocative new theory-building.   
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the major streams of research about 
catastrophic failures, describing what we have learned about why these failures occur as well as 
how they can be prevented.  The chapter begins by describing the most prominent sociological 
school of thought with regard to catastrophic failures, namely normal accident theory.  That body 
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of thought examines the structure of organizational systems that are most susceptible to 
catastrophic failures.  Then, we turn to several behavioral perspectives on catastrophic failures, 
assessing a stream of research that has attempted to understand the cognitive, group and 
organizational processes that develop and unfold over time, leading ultimately to a catastrophic 
failure.  For an understanding of how to prevent such failures, we then assess the literature on 
high reliability organizations (HRO).   These scholars have examined why some complex 
organizations operating in extremely hazardous conditions manage to remain nearly error free.  
The chapter closes by assessing how scholars are trying to extend the HRO literature to develop 
more extensive prescriptions for managers trying to avoid catastrophic failures.    
 
A Structural Perspective 
 Research on catastrophic failures traces its roots to a groundbreaking study of the Three 
Mile Island nuclear power plant accident and the development of normal accident theory.  In his 
1984 book, Normal Accidents, Charles Perrow examined the structural characteristics of 
organizational systems that involve high-risk technologies such as nuclear power.  Perrow’s 
conceptual framework classifies all high-risk systems along two dimensions: interactive 
complexity and coupling.  Interactions within a system may be simple/linear or 
complex/nonlinear.  Coupling may be either loose or tight.  Perrow argues that systems with high 
levels of interactive complexity and tight coupling are especially vulnerable to catastrophic 
failures.  In fact, he argues that accidents are inevitable in these situations; certain failures 
constitute “normal accidents.”  Perrow concludes that, “Normal accidents emerge from the 
characteristics of the systems themselves.  They cannot be prevented.” (Perrow, 1981: 17)  
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Interactive complexity refers to the extent to which different elements of a system 
interact in ways that are unexpected and difficult to perceive or comprehend.  Often, these 
interactions among elements of the system are not entirely visible to the people working in the 
organization.  Simple, linear interactions characterize systems such as a basic manufacturing 
assembly line.  In that instance, the failure of a particular piece of equipment typically has a 
direct, visible impact on the next station along the line.  The operations of a nuclear power plant 
do not follow a simple linear process; instead, they are characterized by complex and nonlinear 
interactions among various subsystems. The failure of one component can have multiple, 
unanticipated effects on various subsystems, making it difficult for an operator to diagnose the 
symptoms of a developing catastrophe.   
Tight coupling exists if different elements of an organizational system are highly 
interdependent and closely linked to one another, such that a change in one area quickly triggers 
changes in other aspects of the system.   Tightly coupled systems have four attributes:  time-
dependent processes, a fairly rigid sequence of activities, one dominant path to achieving the 
goal, and very little slack.  When such rigidity exists within an organization, with few buffers or 
slack among the various parts, small problems can cascade quickly throughout the system 
leading to catastrophe.  Loose coupling exists when subsystems are not as tightly integrated, such 
that small errors in one area can be isolated or absorbed without affecting other subsystems.   
 Engineers naturally try to account for the fact that components or subsystems might fail, 
or human error might occur, in a high-risk technological system.  They design back-up systems 
to deal with those contingencies.  However, engineers encounter difficulty when a strong 
possibility exists for multiple failures to occur in a nearly simultaneous fashion.  When 
interactive complexity and tight coupling exist, then the possibility exists for a series of 
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unanticipated, interconnected breakdowns that can quickly build upon one another.  In short, 
normal accidents often do not have a single cause; they involve a chain of multiple failures.  That 
chain often proves difficult to detect and break before catastrophe strikes.  
 Psychologist James Reason (1997) also argues that catastrophic accidents typically 
involve a chain of failures rather than a single cause.  In his famous “Swiss cheese” analogy, an 
organization’s layers of defense or protection against accidents are described as slices of cheese, 
with the holes in the block of cheese representing the weaknesses in those defenses.  In most 
instances, the holes in a block of Swiss cheese do not line up perfectly, such that one could look 
through a hole on one side and see through to the other side.  In other words, a small error may 
occur, but one of the layers of defense catches it before it cascades throughout the system.  
However, in some cases, the holes become completely aligned, such that an error can traverse the 
block, i.e. cascade quickly through the organizational system.   
 
Critique of Normal Accident Theory 
 Normal accident theory has certain limitations.  First, many scholars and practitioners 
find the theory frustrating, in that it does not move us toward an understanding of how to prevent 
catastrophic accidents.  It appears to have little prescriptive value.  They point out that we should 
not simply resign ourselves to the inevitability of failure in certain situations.  Instead, we should 
try to develop an understanding of how we might reduce the probability of normal accidents.  To 
begin, scholars point out that we can design safer systems by addressing the very attributes 
defined by Perrow.  By trying to reduce interactive complexity and tight coupling, engineers and 
managers can begin to construct safer systems.  We will discuss other remedies for preventing 
catastrophic failures when we address the HRO literature in a subsequent section.  For now, it 
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should simply be pointed out that the HRO scholars have tried to identify the behaviors, norms, 
and processes required to raise people’s awareness of interdependencies and interaction effects, 
as well as to catch small errors before they cascade throughout a system.    
A second major criticism refers to the problems inherent in the classification scheme 
itself.  The two system dimensions articulated by Perrow are useful in helping us understand the 
vulnerability of organizations.  However, one cannot easily classify organizations in his 2x2 
matrix.   For instance, many scholars have characterized commercial aviation as a complex 
system prone to normal accidents.  Marais, Dulac, and Leveson (2004) point out the flaws in this 
argument.  They argue that the U.S. air traffic control infrastructure has been deliberately 
designed as loosely coupled system.  Various measures exist to ensure that problems in one 
sector of airspace or on one particular flight are unlikely to have an impact on the safety of other 
flights.  Similarly, Snook (2000) examines the 1994 accidental shootdown of two U.S. 
Blackhawk helicopters by U.S. fighter jets in northern Iraq.  Based on Perrow’s earlier 
discussion of military and aviation systems, he cannot discern whether the incident should be 
characterized as a tightly or loosely coupled system.  Snook goes on to argue that complex 
organizational systems are fundamentally dynamic entities, and coupling may not be a static 
property of such systems.  Drawing on Weick’s (1976) earlier work, he makes the case that the 
organization responsible for maintaining a no-fly zone over northern Iraq shifted between loose 
and tight coupling over time.  He argues that coupling may be situational, rather than an enduring 
property of organizations.  A system might be loosely coupled most of the time, but then in 
certain relatively rare situations, it becomes rigidly interdependent and interconnected.  In those 
instances, the likelihood a catastrophic accident escalates dramatically.  The critical question, 
then, is not whether a system exhibits tight or loose coupling, but instead how and when does a 
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system migrate from loose to tight coupling, and what can be done to prevent that migration 
from occurring.   
 
Behavioral Perspectives 
 In contrast to normal accident theory, another stream of researchers has studied the 
cognitive, group and organizational processes that lead to the failure to detect errors and/or the 
failure to address errors before they lead to a catastrophic failure.   These researchers have 
focused much more attention on behavior, rather than solely focusing on the structural 
dimensions of organizational systems.  They also have focused much more on the historical 
evolution of catastrophic accidents.  They do not only examine the momentous decision that 
might have immediately preceded a tragedy (such as the critical eve-of-launch meeting that took 
place prior to the Challenger accident), nor do they focus exclusively on the immediate chain of 
events that led to a failure (such as the breakdowns in communication that took place on the 
morning of April 14, 1994 in northern Iraq).  Instead, these scholars examine the gradual 
development of norms, beliefs, and attitudes that contribute to unsafe action.   They try to 
understand the history of decisions that were made in an organization, as well as the danger signs 
that may have been downplayed or misinterpreted over time.  This approach to studying failures 
can be traced back to Barry Turner’s seminal book, Man-Made Disasters, published in 1978.  He 
argued that many catastrophic failures were characterized by incubation periods that stretched 
over many years, not days or hours.  He made a strong case for how catastrophic accidents were 
processes, not events.  They did not simply happen at a point in time; they unfolded in a gradual 
accumulation of actions, decisions, and interpretations by many actors within an organization.  
As such, catastrophic failures required intensive longitudinal study.  Since Turner’s work, many 
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behavioral studies have been done, but a few major developments in the field should be 
highlighted here, not simply because they help us understand better why catastrophic failures 
occur, but also because they provide important guidance as to how we should study failures 
moving forward.    
 
From Proximate Choices to Patterns of Decisions 
 After the Challenger accident in 1986, many scholars focused on the decision to launch 
in cold weather on a January morning, and in particular, on the critical meeting that took place 
on the eve of the launch.   During that infamous midnight teleconference, some engineers argued 
that the unprecedented cold temperatures expected for the following morning could lead to O-
ring failure during launch.  They pushed for a postponement of the mission.  Scholars studied 
this meeting quite carefully, examining the communication failures that took place among the 
group members.  Many people described the Challenger launch decision as a classic case of 
groupthink – a term that social psychologist Irving Janis (1982) coined to describe the pressures 
for conformity, ardent striving for unanimity, and premature convergence that take place within 
many cohesive groups (Moorhead, Ference, and Neck, 1991; Esser and Lindoerfer, 1989).   A 
well-known producer of management training materials even created a best-selling film about 
groupthink which focused, in part, on the Challenger launch decision.  Executives around the 
world participated in seminars, using this video, in which they learned how to avoid the 
groupthink pathology that characterized the eve-of-launch meeting at NASA in January 1986.    
 Ten years after the tragedy, sociologist Diane Vaughan (1996) offered a sharp rebuke to 
the conventional wisdom regarding the Challenger accident.  In her widely acclaimed book, 
Vaughan argued that the many antecedent conditions of groupthink, as described by Janis, did 
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not exist.  For instance, the group that assembled on the midnight teleconference hardly could be 
described as a small cohesive in-group.  It consisted of 34 individuals, some of whom did not 
know one another.  More importantly, however, Vaughan explained that one could not 
understand the causes of the catastrophe simply by studying only the specific decision, made at 
the eve-of launch meeting, to launch the Challenger on January 28, 1996 despite the unusually 
cold temperatures.  She argued that one had to understand the pattern of decisions over time that 
caused NASA officials to view O-ring erosion as an acceptable risk.    
 Vaughan described the normalization of deviance which took place over many years.  In 
that gradual, evolutionary process, engineers and managers moved down a dangerous slippery 
slope.  At first, they did not expect or predict O-ring erosion on shuttle flights.  However, when a 
small amount of erosion was discovered on an early, successful shuttle mission, engineers 
considered it an anomaly.   Then, it happened again.  Gradually, the unexpected became the 
expected.  O-ring erosion began to occur regularly.  Engineers rationalized that sufficient 
redundancy existed to ensure no safety-of-flight risk.   Small deviations became taken-for-
granted.  Over time, however, deviations from the original specification/expectation grew.  
Engineers and managers expanded their view of what constituted acceptable risk.    As the years 
unfolded, Vaughan explained that the “unexpected became the expected became the accepted” 
(Roberto, Bohmer, and Edmondson, 2006).  The launch decision, therefore, could only be 
understood in the context of this long pattern of decisions, during which a gradual normalization 
of deviance took place.  In short, history matters a great deal.  Decisions and catastrophic failures 
cannot be understood without examining their historical context.  When the Columbia accident 
occurred, the investigative board worked closely with Dr. Vaughan, drawing on her expertise to 
examine the historical origins of that disaster.  They once again found a disturbing pattern of 
 12 
normalization of deviance.  Moreover, they studied NASA’s history to try to understand why the 
organization had not learned the lessons of Challenger.    
 
From Decision-Making to Sense-Making 
 Karl Weick offered another important admonition to scholars of catastrophic failure, 
calling attention to whether or not decisions represented the appropriate unit of analysis for 
studies in this area.  In his classic 1993 paper on the Mann Gulch wildfire disaster, Weick argued 
that a sensemaking perspective, rather than a decision-making lens, offered more insight as to 
why thirteen firefighters died in that tragic incident.   
 According to Weick, scholars need to re-think the classic linear view that people decide 
and then act when confronted with a particular situation.  He made the case that individuals often 
act, and then try to make sense of that action.  They engage in an effort to make meaning out of 
the reality around them.  That rationalization process compels them to make certain kinds of 
choices.  In short, individuals often act, and then decide, rather than the other way around.   
 At Mann Gulch, the firefighters initially viewed the situation as what they routinely 
termed “ten o’clock fires,” meaning that they expected to contain the relatively small fire by ten 
o’clock the next morning.  Some indications arose fairly quickly that this blaze would be more 
serious than the typical “ten o’clock fire.”  However, early actions on the part of the crew leader, 
Wag Dodge, as well as other crew members, seemed to confirm the initial assessment of the 
situation.  For instance, Dodge ordered the crew to eat dinner when they landed, and then he later 
left the crew for a short period of time to eat his own supper.   As members tried to make sense 
of those actions, they rationalized that the blaze must not be too serious – perhaps it was only a 
ten o’clock fire.  Later, a prominent crewmember stopped to take photos of the fire, while the 
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men were digging the fire line.  Again, how does one make sense of that action, despite some 
signals that the fire might be more dangerous than originally thought?  Gradually, as the situation 
worsened, Weick argued that the sensemaking processes of the crewmembers collapsed, as it 
became increasingly implausible to rationalize what was taking place in a manner consistent with 
their original conceptualization of the fire.   The firefighters became immobilized, cognitively if 
not physically, by their inner desire to cling to their initial categorization of the fire.  Weick 
explained, then, that the key question is not the quality of decisions made by the firefighters, but 
their inability to socially construct a new reality as the fire progressed:   
“People in Mann Gulch did not face questions like where should we go, when do 
we take a stand, or what should our strategy be?  Instead, they faced the more 
basic, the more frightening feeling that their old labels were no longer working.  
They were outstripping their past experience and were not sure either what was up 
or who they were.  Until they develop some sense of issues like this, there is 
nothing to decide.” (Weick, 1993: 636)  
 
  Weick’s argument remains incredibly powerful, yet one finds it hard to distinguish or 
disentangle decision-making from sensemaking processes in many situations.   To understand the 
actions and behaviors that lead to catastrophic failures, one has to examine the iterative cycle of 
actions, sensemaking, and decisions that takes place over time.  Gary Klein’s (1998) work 
attempts to accomplish this synthesis through his model of recognition-primed decision-making.  
In that research, based on observations and interviews of firefighters, nurses, and naval 
commanders, Klein examines how people – particularly experts – engage in pattern recognition 
based on past experiences.  In his model, a situation generates certain cues, which enable 
individuals to identify patterns based on past experiences.  That pattern recognition process 
triggers a set of action scripts, which individuals assess by mentally simulating the sequence of 
events that will take place if they act in accordance with those scripts.  What Klein describes is 
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essentially a simulated sensemaking process that takes place within the mind as one rapidly 
assesses an action script.  Sensemaking and decision-making come together inside of this mental 
simulation exercise in that split-second moment of intuitive decision on the part of an expert.  Of 
course, pattern recognition processes can go astray, even for experts.  After all, pattern 
recognition is based to a large extent on analogical reasoning.  Scholars have shown that even the 
most intelligent and capable experts can make mistakes when trying to reason by analogy, often 
because individuals focus too intently on the similarities between a current situation and a past 
experience, while downplaying or ignoring the differences (Neustadt and May, 1986; Rivkin and 
Gavetti, 2005).   
 
From Competing Theories to Multiple, Mutually Reinforcing Lenses 
 Individuals typically recognize that equifinality characterizes many situations.  In other 
words, they understand that there are many ways to arrive at the same outcome.  Nevertheless, 
we have a natural tendency to want to play the “blame game” when catastrophic failures occur.  
For instance, when we witness a medical accident, we cry malpractice; we seek to blame 
someone for the error, rather than attributing the poor performance to external and contextual 
factors.  Scholars have avoided this trap to a large extent, by focusing on the systemic, cultural, 
and contextual conditions that make organizations susceptible to catastrophic failures.  However, 
scholars too fail to embrace fully the notion of equifinality.   Rather than bringing multiple 
theoretical perspectives to bear on a particular situation, we often enjoy pitting competing 
theories against one another.  We try to argue that our theoretical perspective outperforms other 
explanations of a particular failure.  Many scholars in this field have gone to great lengths to 
argue that one body of theory is best-suited to explain a specific catastrophic failure.  For 
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instance, Vaughan (1996) spends considerable time explaining why various theories – including 
groupthink – do not accurately explain the causes of the Challenger accident.  She argues quite 
persuasively that her theory of the normalization of deviance provides a more compelling 
explanation based on the facts of the case.  Similarly, scholars often focus on a particular level of 
analysis – individual, group, or organizational – rather than looking at how activities at each 
level may interact with one another.   
 Some scholars, however, have shown that applying multiple conceptual lenses, as well as 
employing multiple levels of analysis, can be a powerful way to explore a complex 
organizational phenomenon.  In his 1971 book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison provided a 
riveting explanation of the Cuban Missile Crisis, drawing on three quite distinct intellectual 
traditions.  Yet, scholars of organizational failure often did not employ such a methodology, until 
two recent studies that examined complex failures both from multiple levels of analysis and 
different conceptual lenses.   Snook’s (2000) study of the 1994 friendly fire incident in Iraq and 
my study of the 1996 Mount Everest tragedy (Roberto, 2002) each tried to examine a failure at 
the individual, group, and organizational levels of analysis.   
The Everest study employed behavioral decision theory at the individual level, the theory 
of psychological safety at the group level (Edmondson, 1999), and normal accident theory at the 
organizational system level to explain why an unprecedented tragedy took place in May 1996.  
Snook employed a wider range of theories to explain the friendly fire accident, drawing on quite 
diverse conceptual lenses such as the theories of social impact, team design, and sensemaking.   
Both studies have one thing in common.  Unlike Allison, they did not present these various 
theories as alternative explanations for the failures.  Instead, they sought to examine the linkages 
among the psychological and sociological forces involved at the individual, group, and 
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organizational system level.  These two studies demonstrated that multiple conceptual lenses, 
applied at three levels of analysis, could serve as complementary and mutually reinforcing 
explanations.   
The Everest study provided important lessons about how the problems of cognitive bias, 
team psychological safety, and complex systems relate to one another and together enhance the 
risk of serious organizational failures.  Often, scholars viewed these individual, group, and 
system-level explanations as distinct ways to explain flawed organizational strategies and 
outcomes.  The Everest study demonstrated that an absence of team psychological safety makes 
it more difficult to avoid cognitive bias, because individuals do not question one another, test 
assumptions, and express minority views.   Systematic biases in judgment become especially 
problematic in complex systems, because one mistake can trigger a series of other breakdowns in 
the system.  Finally, an absence of psychological safety enhances the risk inherent in complex 
systems, because candid discussions do not occur about the sources of failure and the 
interconnections among different components of the system.   
Snook’s study took a slightly different, but highly fruitful, approach to multi-level 
analysis.  After examining the tragedy at three distinct levels of analysis, he concluded that he 
had not yet created a complete explanation of the failure.  Thus, he sought to formulate a cross-
levels account of the tragedy.  From that effort, he posited a new theory of organizational 
behavior, which he coined “practical drift.”  According to this theory, organizations establish 
rules and procedures, but individuals and units within the organization constantly seek better 
ways of doing things.  They engage in practical actions that appear to be locally efficient.  These 
locally efficient procedures become accepted practice and perhaps even “taken-for-granted” by 
many people.  Gradually, actual practice drifts from official procedure.  The drift is not a 
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problem most of the time; but in certain unstable situations, it gets us into big trouble.  Many 
instances of practical drift occurred in the friendly fire incident examined by Snook.   For 
instance, official rules and procedures called for helicopter pilots to switch radio frequencies 
when flying from Turkey into the No Fly Zone in northern Iraq.  However, pilots had decided 
that it was more efficient, and perhaps even safer, to remain on the same frequency when flying 
short missions just over the border.  Gradually, this commonplace technique became accepted 
practice and taken-for-granted.    As pilots rotated out of the Iraqi task force and new pilots 
replaced them, this accepted practice, rather than the official procedure, was passed on from one 
group to another.  Remaining on the same frequency did not cause a tragedy for over one 
thousand days of the operation, but on that fateful day in April 1994, the other layers of 
organizational defense fell by the wayside, and the failure to change radio frequencies served as 
one of the causes of the catastrophe.    For Snook, multiple levels of analysis proved crucial to 
the development of a compelling new theory, as well as a comprehensive explanation of a 
tragedy.  Snook concluded:  “I am more convinced than ever that we cannot fully capture the 
richness of such complex incidents by limiting ourselves to any one or even a series of isolated, 
within-level accounts… [we must] capture the dynamic, integrated nature of organizational 
reality.” (Snook, 2000: 179)  
 
  
From Failure to Success:  High Reliability Organizations 
As researchers began to gain a better understanding of why catastrophic failures 
occurred, a group of scholars started to work concurrently to study complex organizations that 
have operated with very, very few major safety incidents for many years.   Scholars coined the 
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term “high reliability organizations” (HRO) to describe these entities.  Prominent scholars in the 
field include Karlene Roberts, Karl Weick, Todd La Porter, Paula Consolini, Gene Rochlin, and 
Kathleen Sutcliffe.  They have studied organizations such as aircraft carriers and air traffic 
control centers.   The error rates for these organizations are remarkably low, given the hazardous 
conditions in which they operate.  For instance, Roberts (1990) reported that the aviation safety 
record for pilots operating on naval aircraft carriers were amazingly low – slightly less than three 
fatalities per 100,000 hours of flight time.   Roberts argued that HROs have managed to keep 
error rates very low by developing mechanisms to cope with interactive complexity and tight 
coupling.  For instance, she found that HROs employ technical and social redundancy to reduce 
the likelihood of a catastrophic failure.  Technical redundancy refers to components and 
equipment that serve as back-ups in case of failure by the front-line systems.  Social redundancy 
refers to the processes by which individuals back up one another and check on the work of 
others.  Besides redundancy, Roberts discovered that HROs push decision-making down in the 
organization, to ensure that the appropriate experts apply their knowledge in critical situations.  
They also employ training and communication mechanisms to ensure that all individuals 
understand the interconnections among various subsystems and maintain updated, accurate 
situational awareness throughout a hazardous procedure such as the landing of a jet on an aircraft 
carrier.   
In 2001, after roughly a decade of HRO research, Weick and Sutcliffe wrote a book, 
titled Managing the Unexpected, in which they tried to synthesize and integrate what they and 
others such as Karlene Roberts had learned about these complex organizations that performed 
very reliably in hazardous conditions.  They coined the term mindfulness to describe the 
simultaneous existence of five key characteristics of HROs.  First, HROs appeared to be 
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preoccupied with failure of all sizes and shapes.  They did not dismiss small deviations, or settle 
on narrow, localized explanations of these problems.  Instead, they treated each small failure as a 
potential indication of a much larger problem.   David Breashears, the highly accomplished 
mountaineer, has described the preoccupation with failure that characterizes successful 
expeditions. He has argued that many climbers focus almost exclusively on the notion of success 
(with success being defined as reaching the summit of one of the world’s tallest mountains).  
These climbers think that they will enhance their odds of reaching the summit if they wall 
themselves off to any possible image or conception of failure.  Breashears argues that this is 
precisely the wrong approach.  Great climbers obsess with the notion of failure.  They simulate 
failure scenarios in their head, long before they head to a mountain.  Moreover, they pay close 
attention to every detail, and they painstakingly assess whether a small deviation from plan 
might compromise the entire expedition.  Organizations such as Toyota similarly have been 
found to obsess with failure, building organizational processes for highlighting and assessing the 
smallest of deviations that occur during the automobile production process. 
Second, Weick and Sutcliffe argued that HROs exhibit a reluctance to simplify 
interpretations.  In short, we all seek to simplify the complex world around us.  We create 
categories and labels to help us cope with complexity.  For the most part, this simplification 
process serves us well.  Without it, we sometimes would find ourselves paralyzed in the face of 
ambiguous data and stimuli.  However, we get into trouble when we fail to shed old categories 
and labels as contextual conditions change.  In some cases, we oversimplify a situation, by trying 
to slap a label or category on a situation for which it doesn’t quite fit.  HROs try to maintain a 
healthy diversity of perspectives within the organization, and they constantly test their simplified 
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models of reality.  They build in requisite variety, particularly with regard to the diverse 
composition of teams, so as to reduce the likelihood of over-simplification or mis-categorization.   
 Third, HROs demonstrate sensitivity to operations.  They do not allow the emphasis on 
the big picture – strategic plans, vision statements, etc. – to minimize the importance of front-line 
operations, where the real work gets done.  HROs encourage the people on the front lines to 
identify latent errors – those lapses in organizational defenses that do not usually cause serious 
negative consequences, but which might suggest system deficiencies that should be corrected, 
lest a large-scale failure eventually occur (Reason, 1997).   
Fourth, HROs exhibit a commitment to resilience.  They recognize that no hazardous and 
complex system will be error free.  However, they develop mechanisms for catching and 
recovery from small failures before they cascade through multiple subsystems of an 
organization.  HROs have the ability to improvise when small errors occur, and they move 
quickly to learn from failure.   
Finally, HROs ensure that expertise is tapped into at all levels of the organization.  They 
push decision-making authority down, and they migrate decisions in real-time to the location in 
the organization where the most relevant expertise lies.  They do not let formal hierarchy, status, 
or power dictate decision-making during times of stress.  Instead, they try to ensure that people at 
lower levels can apply their expertise to solve thorny and urgent problems without fear of 
retribution from their superiors.    
Taken together, these five characteristics comprise what Weick and Sutcliffe call 
“mindfulness.”   When they use the term mindful, they mean that HROs are highly attuned to the 
unexpected, to the ambiguous threats that emerge at all levels.  They remain intellectually 
curious at all times, and they operate in a spirit of inquiry when faced with tough issues. In other 
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words, they seek to open up new avenues of discussion when the unexpected occurs, rather than 
trying to press quickly toward a simple explanation or solution.  
 
Critique of HRO Theory 
The HRO literature has several important limitations and weaknesses.  First, some 
scholars question the very definition of HROs.  They point to Roberts’ definition, in which she 
states that if an organization could have encountered catastrophic failures thousands of times, but 
did not, then it can be described as highly reliable.  These researchers suggest that a wide array 
of organizations fit these criteria, rendering the classification rather meaningless (Marais, Dulac, 
and Leveson, 2004).  Scholars also argue that many of the organizations studied by HRO 
researchers do not actually exhibit the high level of interactive complexity and the tight coupling 
described in Perrow’s model of normal accidents (Marais, Dulac, and Leveson, 2004).  
 A second major line of critique centers on the concept of redundancy, which is at the 
heart of many HRO studies.  Here, scholars can point back to Perrow’s original theory, in which 
he stressed that redundancy often can enhance the likelihood of catastrophic failure in high-risk 
systems, because redundant features can either increase interactive complexity or tight coupling.  
That negative side effect holds true not only for more redundant technical systems, but also 
social ones.  More behavioral rules and procedures can create more rigidity, i.e. tight coupling.  
Redundant systems also can make it even more difficult for individuals to diagnose what is 
wrong with a complex technology.  Moreover, people can become complacent, indeed overly 
reliant on redundant technological systems at times, as the military officers might have been in 
the friendly fire incident in northern Iraq.  Snook also pointed out that social redundancy can be 
problematic, because individuals are not always acting independently – a key precondition for 
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effective redundancy.  Snook found that efforts to create social redundancy perversely led to a 
diffusion of responsibility and ambiguous lines of authority.  As a result, the human checks and 
balances did not function properly.   The fighter pilots’ over-reliance on that flawed social 
redundancy may have contributed to the tragedy.  
Finally, the HRO literature has been criticized because it appears to be arguing that 
increased vigilance lies at the heart of all efforts to increase safety.   In short, are we simply 
asking organizations to be more careful?   HRO scholars have identified some key attributes of 
organizations that are highly attuned to safety considerations, but more work could be done to 
identify the concrete mechanisms and processes that organizations can put into practice to 
increase safety.   How precisely do I become more careful?   How do we move from individual 
care to organizational vigilance? Second, and perhaps more importantly, some scholars have 
questioned whether HRO scholars have given due consideration to the tradeoff between safety 
and other organizational goals and objectives.  Marais, Dulac, and Leveson (2004) have pointed 
out, for instance, that aircraft carriers operating during peacetime have safety as a primary goal, 
given that they are simply running training missions.  At the end of the day, the objective is to 
return each pilot safety to the deck of the ship, not to hit enemy targets, etc.  Few thorny 
tradeoffs between safety and other objectives exist during peacetime operations, which is when 
HRO scholars studied aircraft carrier operations.   
 
Future Directions 
 While this chapter clearly illustrates that we have learned a great deal about the causes of 
catastrophic failures, more work needs to be done to help us understand how such accidents can 
be prevented.  The HRO literature has made substantial strides in this area, but it has some 
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limitations.  The question remains:  How does an organization become “preoccupied with 
failure” and without completely sacrificing its other goals and objectives?   If organizations 
become attuned to all the ambiguous signals or threats that arise, will they ever get any of their 
work done?   Can a company serve customers and make reasonable profits if it is constantly 
sounding alarms about subtle and weak signals of potential safety or quality issues? 
Recent studies have begun to explore this question.  One promising line of inquiry 
involves the study of Rapid Response Teams in health care organizations (Buist, Moore, et al., 
2002; Park, 2006; Roberto, Bohmer, and Edmondson, 2006).  Many hospitals have begun to 
implement a process for amplifying and exploring weak signals.   When “code blues” occurred in 
hospitals in the past (i.e. crisis teams responding to a patient experiencing cardiac arrest), staff 
members often noted that the patient’s condition had been deteriorating for several hours prior to 
the code.   However, front-line staff members – typically nurses – often did not voice their 
concerns to those with more status and formal authority in the organization (such as surgeons).  
Researchers found that several early warning signs tended to precede unexpected cardiac arrests.   
In some cases, these pieces of data were quantifiable, i.e. acute changes in respiratory rate or 
oxygen saturation.  In other instances, nurses might simply notice a shift in the patient’s 
appearance, cognitive ability, or demeanor.   
Hospitals have now created lists of these early warning signs, and they have empowered 
nurses to call in a “rapid response team” – if they see one of these warning signals – so as to help 
them assess the significance of these ambiguous threats.   Hospitals often describe this process as 
“calling a trigger” – meaning that front-line staffers are identifying a small problem that may 
trigger a serious incident in the near future.  These rapid response teams are cross-disciplinary 
groups that are highly skilled at quickly assessing whether a warning sign merits further action.   
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This rapid response process enables and empowers inexperienced nurses to speak up when 
something doesn’t look right.  Many hospitals have reported substantial decreases in the number 
of “code blues” after implementing rapid response teams.  They also report that many other 
improvement ideas have emerged from this process, even in instances when the threats did not 
prove to be “real.”  Perhaps most importantly, the benefits of these new rapid response teams 
easily outweigh the costs, and they do not appear to interfere unnecessarily with the care of other 
healthier patients.   
Why do these rapid response teams increase preoccupation with failure and enhance 
patient safety without unduly increasing costs or sacrificing other organizational goals and 
objectives (such as profit maximization)?   Here, we must go back to the concept of shared 
cognition which is at the heart of the HRO literature.  Individuals and groups working in HROs 
build a strong sense of shared situational awareness, as well as a strong sense of system 
awareness.  They understand how situations are unfolding, how their work relates to that done by 
others, and how the human and technical systems function.  Bigley and Roberts (2001) point out 
that HROs constantly update these cognitive representations of a complex reality, processing 
real-time information very quickly to maintain a current shared picture of a hazardous situation.   
To understand how rapid response teams enhance mindfulness without unduly burdening 
the organization with excess costs, we have to bring together two streams of work:  the HRO 
scholars’ work on mindfulness and Klein’s (1998) work on pattern recognition.  Recall that 
Klein has shown how expert decision-makers discern patterns very quickly based on past 
experience, and this pattern recognition triggers action scripts.  One can argue that rapid response 
teams build individual as well as shared pattern recognition capabilities within the organization.  
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They are a concrete mechanism for not only surfacing weak signals, but also rapidly and 
inexpensively evaluating those signals and refining the diagnosis of those signals over time.    
As experts interact with front-line employees, and constantly react to weak signals, they 
may become better and better at recognizing patterns – as individuals, as teams, and as an entire 
organization.  First, people may become better at identifying the subtle, non-quantifiable signals 
of future harm.   In particular, as experts interact with novices, they help develop the pattern 
recognition capabilities of newer, inexperienced front-line employees.  Consequently, novices 
get better at spotting weak signals, and perhaps spot them earlier as well.  Novices get better, in 
particular, when the warning signs are non-quantifiable, e.g., when the patient’s appearance has 
simply changed without alterations in his or her vital signs.  Second, people may begin to 
develop a stronger capability to discern which signals are real, and which are merely “false 
alarms.”  In the long run, that will reduce the number of triggers that are called for non-serious 
situations.  Third, people may learn how to more quickly assess the validity of a weak signal – 
thereby reducing the time associated with each deployment of a rapid response team.   Finally, 
people begin to see patterns that cut across the organization, i.e. these types of patients tend to 
experience triggers for this specific set of reasons – we need to be proactively attentive to those 
situations.  The organization can then move from simply being reactive – responding to weak 
signals after they arise – toward a more proactive orientation in which they seek out the 
situations in which signals are more likely to arise and accidents are more likely to occur.  That 
proactive approach can not only improve patient safety, but it also may reduce costs, as it 
becomes more expensive to treat a patient if their condition deteriorates.   
More work certainly needs to be done to develop our understanding of the concrete 
mechanisms by which organizations become more mindful without sacrificing other goals and 
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objectives.  The rapid response team work represents one promising line of inquiry; many others 
surely exist.  For instance, in a 1999 Harvard Business Review article, Steven Spear and Kent 
Bowen examined the inner workings of the Toyota Production System.  Toyota represents an 
organization which is extremely preoccupied with small failures.  Without question, they are an 
auto industry leader in terms of quality.  However, they also have one of the highest levels of 
productivity in the industry.  They appear to have developed a system whereby reliability is 
enhanced without sacrificing cost efficiency.   
As scholars continue to study catastrophic failure, they should take heart from the recent 
work that has been done in the health care field as well as on the Columbia shuttle accident. 
Hospitals around the world are trying to learn from the literature discussed in this chapter.  
Similarly, the Columbia accident investigators reached out to scholars such as Diane Vaughan 
and Karl Weick to understand what went wrong at NASA.  In both instances, we see 
practitioners seeking out scholars to help them understand the organizational causes of accidents 
and the potential prescriptions for reducing the risk of catastrophic failures.  Research appears to 
be impacting practice, and rapid advances in practice are informing new theory development.  
That synergy between scholarship and practice promises to be much fruit in the years ahead.   
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